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Introduction
An increasing number of credit cards now contain  
a tiny wireless computer chip and antenna based on 
RFID (radio frequency identification) and contactless 
smart card technology.1 The RFID-enabled credit cards 
permit contactless payments that are fast, easy, and 
often more reliable than magnetic stripe card transac-
tions, and only physical proximity (rather than con-
tact) is required between this type of credit card and 
the reader. An estimated 20 million RFID-enabled 
credit cards and 150,000 vendor readers are already 
deployed in the U.S. (Bray, 2006). According to Visa 
USA, “This has been the fastest acceptance of new 
payment technology in the history of the industry” 
(Bray, 2006).
The conveniences of RFID-enabled credit cards 
also lead to new risks for security and privacy. Tradi-
tional (magnetic stripe) credit cards require visual ac-
cess or direct physical contact for retrieving information, 
such as the cardholder’s name and the credit card 
number. By contrast, RFID-enabled credit cards make 
these and other sensitive pieces of data available  
using a small radio transponder that is energized and 
interrogated by a reader.
Experimental results 
Although RFID-enabled credit cards are widely 
reported to use sophisticated cryptography,2 our ex-
periments found several surprising vulnerabilities in 
every system we examined. We collected two commer-
cial readers from two independent manufacturers and 
approximately 20 RFID-enabled credit cards issued 
in the last year from three major payment associations 
and several issuing banks in the U.S. We were unable 
to locate public documentation on the proprietary 
commands used by RFID-enabled credit cards. Thus, 
we reverse-engineered the protocols and constructed 
inexpensive devices that emulate both the credit cards 
and readers. The experiments indicate that all the cards 
are susceptible to live relay attacks (in which an attacker 
relays verbatim a message from the sender to a valid 
receiver of the message), all the cards are susceptible 
to disclosure of personal information, and many of 
the cards are susceptible to various types of replay  
attacks (a form of network attack in which a valid data 
transmission is maliciously or fraudulently repeated 
or delayed). In addition, we successfully completed a 
proof-of-concept cross-contamination attack.
Given the size and diversity of our sample set, we 
believe that our results reflect the current state of de-
ployed RFID-enabled credit cards; however, card issuers 
continue to innovate and will likely add new security 
features. Our findings are not necessarily exhaustive, 
and there may exist cards that use security mechanisms 
beyond what we have observed.
Background
In this section, we provide some background on 
the current state and standards of RFID technology 
and its deployment throughout the United States.51 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
Scale of current deployment 
Several large chain stores in the U.S. have de-
ployed many thousands of RFID readers for credit cards: 
CVS Pharmacies (all 5,300 locations), McDonald’s 
(12,000 of 13,700 locations), the Regal Entertainment 
Group of movie theaters, and several other large  
vendors (Koper, 2006; and O’Connor, 2006). Reports 
estimate that 20 million to 55 million RFID-enabled 
credit cards are in circulation, which is 5 percent to 
14 percent of all credit cards (Averkamp, 2005; Bray, 
2006; and Koper, 2006). In addition to traditional 
payment contexts, RFID-enabled credit cards are  
becoming accepted in other contexts such as public 
transportation (Heydt-Benjamin, Chae, et al., 2006). 
The New York City subway (Metropolitan Transit 
Authority, 2006) recently started a trial of 30 stations 
accepting an estimated 100,000 RFID-enabled credit 
cards (SourceMedia Inc., 2006). A participant in this 
trial uses her credit card as a transit ticket as well as a 
credit card in place of the traditional magnetic-stripe-
based dedicated subway tickets.
Integration of radio frequency technology into 
existing credit card infrastructure
In a typical deployment, an RFID-enabled credit 
card reader is attached to a traditional cash register. 
Each reader continually broadcasts a radio signal to 
which RFID-enabled credit cards can respond. The 
RFID-enabled payment cards that we examined seem 
to have been designed specifically for easy integration 
into the existing payment authorization infrastructure. 
For instance, even though no magnetic stripes are read 
during an RF transaction, the RFID-enabled credit 
card readers that we examined reformat the received 
RFID data into “Track 1 Data” and “Track 2 Data” 
before passing them along to point-of-sale (POS) termi-
nals. In other words, data are presented to the charge-
processing network in the same format regardless of 
whether the credit card reader received the informa-
tion from an RF transaction or a traditional swipe of  
a magnetic stripe.
Our work focuses on the first step in a long chain 
of system interactions: card presentation. When con-
sidering the potential impact of the vulnerabilities we 
have observed in RFID-enabled card presentation, one 
must take into account the expertise credit card issu-
ers have gained in detecting fraudulent transactions 
by tracking patterns of behavior (Dougherty, 2000). 
While detecting fraud is an effective defense against 
many types of financial risk, it does not prevent inva-
sion of privacy. Our study considers vulnerabilities to 
privacy that today’s antifraud methods do not prevent.
Communications protocol used by RFID-enabled 
credit cards 
All of the credit cards we tested use a communica-
tions protocol specified by the International Organization 
for Standardization (ISO) in a series of documents  
titled ISO 14443-1 through 14443-4.3 Our experiments 
indicate that the cards use the B version of this protocol, 
with an additional proprietary communications layer 
carried over ISO layer 4.
Related work
RFID-enabled credit cards share many of the chal-
lenges and approaches for security and privacy as 
other RFID-based authentication and identification 
systems. We discuss some of these here.
RFID authentication and cloning 
Many types of RFID tags merely emit static iden-
tifiers, making them easy to clone. These tags are some-
times used in inappropriate contexts such as building 
access control. Westhues (2005) has demonstrated a 
simple, inexpensive device that can skim many types 
of cards at a distance—even through walls—and then 
simulate them. (Skimming is the theft of credit card 
information used in an otherwise legitimate transac-
tion.) If unclonability is a security assumption, then 
this is a security break.
More sophisticated tags do not emit static data, 
but use cryptography to emit different data during differ-
ent transactions. For example, the Texas Instruments’ 
digital signal transponder (DST) is present in the 
ExxonMobil Speedpass (a keychain RFID device), 
and is also part of a common theft deterrent system 
for automobiles. These systems have been shown to 
be vulnerable because of faulty cryptography (Bono 
et al., 2005). In contrast with the RFID-enabled credit 
cards we examined, the DST uses cryptography to  
increase the difficulty of cloning, but it does not carry 
personally identifying information, for example, the 
name of its owner.
Read ranges
Industry claims around the security of RFID  
devices often hinge on their short read ranges. Some 
cautionary notes are in order, however: RFID tags do 
not have a single, definitive read range (Juels, 2006). 
While the nominal read range of an RFID tag may be 
quite short, a nonstandard reader or large antenna can 
increase the range at which an attacker can skim an 
RFID tag. The credit cards we examined are ISO 
14443-B cards with a nominal range of 4–5 centime-
ters. Skimming ranges of over 20 centimeters have been 
demonstrated for cards of this type (Hancke, 2006), 52 1Q/2009, Economic Perspectives
and ranges of up to 50 centimeters are hypothesized 
in the literature (Kfir and Wool, 2005). Furthermore, 
while skimming requires that a reader power the tar-
geted tag, an attacker performing passive eavesdrop-
ping on a session between a legitimate reader and 
RFID tag can potentially harvest tag data at a consid-
erably longer range. Claims have surfaced of tests 
where e-passports, which rely on the same ISO stan-
dard as credit cards, were read at a distance of 30 feet 
(Yoshida, 2004)4 and detected at a distance of 20  
meters (EPIC, 2005). 
Our study makes no claims about the read ranges 
of RFID-enabled credit cards beyond the observation 
that characterization of these ranges is not straightfor-
ward and constitutes an important open research question.
Methodology and experiments
The following discussion highlights our method-
ology for testing the security of RFID-enabled credit 
cards against eavesdropping, skimming, and replay.  
A more detailed version is available in our technical 
report (see Heydt-Benjamin, Bailey, et al., 2006).
Eavesdropping experiments
In our eavesdropping experiments, we observed 
transactions between readers and cards with an oscil-
loscope attached to an antenna. Examination of data 
thus obtained demonstrated the efficacy of this simple 
attack, since in all transactions the cardholder’s full 
name and card expiration date were present in “cleartext” 
(that is, this information was in a form that was im-
mediately comprehensible to a human being without 
additional processing, implying a lack of cryptographic 
protection). A majority of cards examined transmitted 
the credit card number in cleartext, while a minority 
broadcast a separate (but static) credit card number 
apparently reserved for wireless transactions. We pro-
vide further details in the analysis and results section.
Skimming experiments
In our most simple skimming experiment, we 
took a commercial RFID-enabled credit card reader 
and presented it with each of our experimental cards, 
obtaining in each case ISO 7813 (magnetic stripe style) 
data. Since these are the exact data normally transmitted 
by a POS terminal to a charge-processing network, 
this most naive of skimming attacks is sufficient for 
perpetration of certain kinds of financial fraud. 
We programmed an RFID reader not intended for 
credit card use to emulate an RFID-enabled credit card 
reader. Eavesdropping on transactions between our 
credit card reader emulator and real RFID-enabled 
credit cards demonstrated that all of the RFID credit 
cards we tested responded to our emulator exactly as 
they respond to a commercial RFID-enabled credit 
card reader. This strongly suggests that cards do not use 
any secure mechanism to authenticate an authorized 
RFID reader before releasing sensitive information. 
Replay experiments
Our credit card emulator is a microprocessor 
controlled device with a simple radio, permitting 
broadcast of arbitrary bytes over the ISO 14443-B 
transport layer.
We programmed our credit card emulator to ex-
pect the RFID-enabled credit card reader commands 
that we captured during eavesdropping experiments 
and then to transmit replies captured from real RFID-
enabled credit cards during a skimming attack per-
formed with the reader emulator. In our experiments, 
commercial readers were unable to distinguish between 
our emulated card and the real card upon which it 
was based. 
Since the output from the card emulator is identi-
cal to that of the real card from which it was skimmed, 
a simple replay attack using this device would suc-
ceed. As noted previously, many pieces of data go 
into an overall transaction approval decision, including 
sophisticated risk-based fraud detection mechanisms 
on the back end. For this reason, valuable future  
research would include field tests in which a credit 
card emulator is used to perform a purchase in a retail 
location rather than in a laboratory.
Analysis and results
To protect the identity of our cards, we label the 
cards A, B, and C based on semantic equivalence 
classes determined by observing behavior between 
cards and readers. Table 1 summarizes some of the 
vulnerabilities of three classes of cards.
Observations of RFID-enabled credit card protocols
This section explores some of the RFID-enabled 
credit card protocols that are in current deployment. 
The analysis is based on the ISO 7813 (magnetic stripe 
format) data output by the serial port of RFID-enabled 
credit card readers when presented with different types 
of credit cards. Where pertinent, our analysis compares 
this serial output with the raw RF data from the same 
transactions as captured by our eavesdropping apparatus.
In keeping with a philosophy of ethical attacks 
research, we have redacted several pieces of informa-
tion from the following subsections in part to prevent 
criminal misuse of our findings. The cardholder’s name 
and the card number have been concealed. Addition-
ally, we have obscured the number of digits in the 
card number in order to obscure which observations 53 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
 
TABlE 1
Vulnerabilities of three classes of cards
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correlate with the products of specific payment asso-
ciations and issuing banks. 
Card A protocol
When presented (RF transaction) with any sam-
ple of a card of type A, our reader outputs serial data 
identical to the data contained on the magnetic stripe 
of the same credit card (see figure 1). When presented 
with the same card, the output is always the same: In 
the serial output there is no evidence of a counter, 
one-time password, or any other mechanism for pre-
vention of replay attacks.
Card B protocol
The sample card B output in figure 2 demonstrates 
the presence of a counter, determined to be as such 
because of monotonic incrementation with successive 
transactions. Additionally we observe three digits that 
change with each transaction in no pattern that we 
have identified. Because of the relatively high entropy 
of these three digits, we consider it likely that they 
are the output of some cryptographic algorithm that 
takes the transaction counter as an input. If this is the 
case, then the algorithm must also take a card-specific 
value like a cryptographic key as an input, since we 
observe that different cards with the same counter 
value produce different codes. We speculate that these 
data may serve as a stand-in for the traditional card 
verification code (CVC).
Card C protocol 
Card C’s protocol differs from card B’s in a few 
crucial details:
n  Its unique transaction codes are eight digits in-
stead of three;
n  Its transaction counter, now located 
in the cardholder’s name field, dis-
plays only three digits instead of 
four; and
n  Rather than sending the embossed 
card number over the air, it uses a 
fixed pseudonym.
See figure 3 for the sample card C output.
Analysis of RFID-enabled credit card 
protocols
In the following sections, we analyze 
the susceptibility of the card types to  
replay, relay, cross-contamination, and 
privacy/tracking attacks. Our analysis 
considers only the protection mechanisms 
of the cards and readers; we do not ana-
lyze the security of the charge-processing 
network (for example, the fraud detection 
algorithms).
Replay attacks 
Replay attacks come in several flavors, depending 
on what data are communicated from the credit card 
all the way to the back-end charge-processing net-
work. The following describe the different types of 
replay attacks.
n  Unrestricted replay: A card that always reports 
the same data need be scanned only once. After 
that, the attacker can replay the captured data at 
will, and the processing network cannot detect 
any difference between a replay and successive 
transactions with a real card. Since we observed 
the serial output from real POS readers to always 
be static with respect to cards of type A, we con-
clude that cards of this type are susceptible to 
this attack.
n  Replay with race condition: A card that uses a 
transaction counter and rolling code poses more 
of a challenge if the back-end processing network 
stores and checks counter values. In such a case, 
once transaction n has been accepted by the net-
work, transactions numbered less than n should 
be declined if presented. However, if an adver-
sary skims a transaction from a card and replays 
that transaction to the network before the legiti-
mate user has a chance to use her card, then the 
charge-processing network should accept the  
adversary’s transactions and actually decline the 
legitimate ones. Although the attacker is faced 
with a counter synchronization problem, such 
challenges are far easier to defeat than the  54 1Q/2009, Economic Perspectives
cryptographic problems (we prefer to base our  
security on cryptography whenever possible).
n  Counter rollover: If a transaction counter is the 
only changing input to a code, then the number 
of possible codes is limited by the maximum 
possible transaction counter value. There are 
then two cases. In one case, the counter is  
permitted to roll over, repeating from the begin-
ning, thus also repeating the codes from the be-
ginning. In the other case, the card refuses to 
engage in additional transactions after the coun-
ter is exhausted.
  In the first case, an adversary that has sufficient 
time in proximity to a card can build a database of 
all possible counter values and their correspond-
ing codes, and therefore can mimic all possible 
behavior of the target card. Cards of type B are 
susceptible to this attack.
  In the second case, a denial-of-service attack can 
be perpetrated against the card if the attacker has 
sufficient time in proximity to exhaust the counter 
by repeated skimming. Our experiments deter-
mined that cards of type C exhibit this behavior.
Relay attack
Even with a hypothetical card that combines a 
challenge-response protocol with a transaction coun-
ter (a case not examined here), the relay attack may 
still succeed (Hancke, 2005). In an example of a relay 
attack, the adversary consists of a mole and a proxy 
that perform a purchase at an innocent user’s ex-
pense. The mole possesses a clandestine credit card 
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proxy’s clandestine credit card emulator. The mole 
sits down or stands next to the user, and the mole’s 
device rapidly discovers the user’s credit card. The 
proxy receiving this relayed signal approaches the 
POS terminal and initiates a purchase. The proxy 
presents his credit card emulator to the POS terminal. 
The emulator receives commands from the POS ter-
minal and relays them to the mole’s device, which 
transmits the commands to the user’s credit card. The 
responses from the user’s card are likewise relayed 
through the mole’s device and are broadcast from the 
proxy’s emulator to the POS terminal. The purchase 
should succeed, and the cost will be charged to the user. 
Observe that even with application-layer challenge-
response or transaction-counter protocols, this attack 
will still succeed, as protocol messages will simply 
be relayed between the card and reader.
Cross-contamination attack
To analyze the feasibility of a cross-contamina-
tion attack, we took a credit card of type A, placed it 
in a sealed envelope, and performed a “Johnny Carson 
attack,” by reading the card through the envelope us-
ing our custom programmed TI s4100 reader.
We combined the data thus obtained with address 
and telephone information looked up in the telephone 
directory given the cardholder’s name transmitted through 
the envelope (for postal mail, the attacker already knows 
the cardholder’s address!). Using only this informa-
tion we placed an online purchase for electronic parts 
from one of our major research parts suppliers. Our 
purchase was successful, and we conclude that the 
cross-contamination attack is effective for cards of 
type A and merchants that do not require a CVC.
Privacy invasion and tracking
Our eavesdropping transcripts show that person-
ally identifying information is broadcast in cleartext 
by every RFID-enabled credit card we have examined.
This must be considered a privacy vulnerability 
in that automated full identification of a person carry-
ing an RFID-enabled credit card is easily demonstrated 
in the lab, and should be feasible in the field. This vulner-
ability is exacerbated by an adversary who could use 
the full identity disclosure of the RFID-enabled credit 
card to build up a database of associated pseudonyms 
based on other RFID tags with a longer read range that 
a user may commonly carry.
In addition, the transaction counter found in some 
of the cards could be exploited by a vendor: By storing 
the transaction counter, a retailer could tell how often 
the card was used to purchase goods from others. Those 
heavily using their cards might be targeted for specif-
ic advertising, for instance.
Countermeasures
In addition to fraud detection to limit financial 
risk, several other countermeasures could significant-
ly reduce risk of fraud and invasion of privacy. We 
discuss some of these countermeasures here. 
Shielding and blocking
One countermeasure to some cases of skimming 
and relay attacks is to ensure that credit cards are un-
readable when not in use. A Faraday cage is a physi-
cal cover that assumes the form of a metal sheet or 
mesh that is opaque to certain radio waves. Consumers 
can today purchase Faraday cages in the form of wal-
lets and slipcases to shield their RFID-enabled cards 
against unwanted scanning (DIFRwear LCC, 2006). 
Note that this countermeasure offers no protection 
when the card is in use, since a card must be removed 
from a shielded wallet before an RF purchase can be 
made. However, credit card companies ought to at 
least ship cards through the mail enclosed in a Faraday 
cage to obviate the dangers of the Johnny Carson attack.
A slightly more sophisticated approach to pre-
venting attack against dormant RFID devices is to 
disrupt ambient RFID communication. Blocker tags 
(Juels, Rivest, and Szydlo, 2003) and the RFID 
Guardian (Rieback et al., 2006) are two examples of 
devices that can selectively disrupt RFID communi-
cations to offer tag owners improved access control.
Signaling cardholder’s intent
As an alternative approach to protections such as 
the Faraday cage, the credit cards themselves could 
be modified to activate only after indication of user 
intent. A simple push button would serve this purpose 
(Selker, 2003), but more sophisticated sensors might 
serve the same purpose, such as light sensors that ren-
der cards inactive in the dark, heat sensors that detect 
the proximity of the human hand, motion sensors that 
detect a telltale “tap-and-go” trajectory. Ultimately, 
credit card functionality will see incorporation into 
higher-powered consumer devices, such as near-field-
communication-ready (NFC-ready) mobile phones, 
and will benefit from the security protections of these 
host devices, such as biometric sensors and increased 
computational capacity (Carey, 2006).
Better cryptography
Contactless smart cards capable of robust cryp-
tography have long been available. These techniques 
have already been applied to payment cards in the 
EMV (EuroPay, MasterCard, Visa) standards, detailed 
in the next section. If personally identifiable data can 
only be decrypted by authorized readers, then the dan-
ger of many of the privacy invasion attacks discussed 56 1Q/2009, Economic Perspectives
here are obviated. Anecdotal accounts suggest payment 
associations are moving to improve the on-chip crypto-
graphic features of these cards, including challenge-
response protocols, to further frustrate replay attacks.
Discussion
As time goes on and technology costs decrease, 
we can expect issuers to provide more effective cryp-
tographic protocols. Well-established methods to thwart 
these attacks already exist, and issuers may in fact al-
ready be implementing these defenses. But even to-
day, in most cases an attacker has easier avenues to 
exploit than RF-based attacks to perpetrate financial 
fraud. For instance, simple cloning of cards is often 
not sufficient to commit fraud. There are many back-
end fraud detection measures in place to help thwart 
fraudulent use of card information. Nevertheless, pri-
vacy vulnerabilities should be addressed wherever 
they are found; privacy invasion may lead to financial 
fraud, but preventing financial fraud is not the only 
reason to protect privacy. 
Comparison with other types of fraud
It is hard to directly compare the security of tra-
ditional magnetic stripe cards and RFID-enabled 
cards. RFID-enabled cards are only more secure than 
their traditional counterparts against certain kinds of 
attacks. For example, some traditional card reading 
mechanisms, such as taking a physical carbon copy 
of the face of the card, leave a physical image of the 
card in the hands of a possibly adversarial merchant 
or clerk. In fact, the use of a magnetic stripe generally 
means handing one’s card to a clerk who may have 
nefarious intent. By contrast, an RF transaction leaves 
behind no physical carbon copy; in fact, the card nev-
er leaves the cardholder’s hands. Certainly, the effort 
required to obtain an RF copy of the transaction is 
greater in this case.
Additionally some RFID-enabled cards include  
a unique code for each transaction replacing the static 
data in a magnetic stripe. This mechanism protects 
against some kinds of attacks, but creates opportuni-
ties for new types of attacks that cannot be easily ad-
dressed by traditional fraud control (such as cardholder 
tracking attacks).
Perhaps the most important difference between 
RFID-enabled cards and traditional cards is the dif-
ference in the cardholder’s control. Whereas a tradi-
tional magnetic stripe reveals one’s name and card 
number only when the artifact is physically handed  
to a merchant, an RFID-enabled card is in some sense 
“always on.” The card can be scanned and privacy 
can be compromised remotely without the knowledge 
or consent of the cardholder. 
Comparison with other electronic cards
The relationship between the cards we examined 
and the EMV series of standards is unclear (EMVCo 
LLC, 2004). Certainly in Europe, EMV techniques such 
as the UK’s “Chip and PIN” (personal identification 
number) are seeing wide deployment and analysis.5 But 
based on our observations, the protocols used by the U.S. 
contactless cards do not appear in the EMV standards.
It is not clear to us why the U.S. payment associ-
ations have chosen to develop new protocols, with 
significant vulnerabilities, rather than use the more 
secure protocols that have already been deployed in 
Europe. We can surmise that this choice was motivated 
by the prevalence of online readers in the U.S. (some 
of the expense of supporting the EMV standards has 
to do with support for off-line operation) and a focus 
on contactless operation (whereas most of Europe’s 
cards are contact-based). 
Policy and regulation
Several state legislatures have recently consid-
ered bills on RFID. For instance, California Governor 
Arnold Schwarzenegger recently vetoed his state’s 
bill SB 768, which would have required interim pro-
tections for RFID cards, especially cards carrying 
personally identifiable information, and a process for 
figuring out long-term protections (Ferguson, 2006; 
and Molnar, 2006). The information made available 
by the cards, including the cardholder’s name and 
card number are called personally identifiable infor-
mation (PII) in the parlance of that bill (Molnar, 2006). 
If signed into law, ID cards issued by the state gov-
ernment carrying PII would have been required to 
implement mutual authentication and encryption to 
release the data. While credit cards are not state ID 
cards, as time goes on we can expect more RFID- 
related legislation like California’s SB 768 to be in-
troduced. Indeed, U.S. Senator Charles Schumer (D–NY) 
recently announced his intent to increase federal regu-
lation of RFID-enabled credit cards (Chan, 2006).
Beyond regulation, it is an important open ques-
tion as to how best to offer incentives for all custodi-
ans of personal data to take adequate precautions. Risk 
management is critical to the financial industry. How-
ever, as researchers and providers of risk management,  
we have yet to find a satisfying definition of privacy. 
How do we quantify user privacy when different us-
ers place a different value on privacy? In hard figures, 
how does this value affect the bottom line of busi-
nesses that are custodians of personal data?57 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
Conclusion
Despite the millions of RFID-enabled payment 
cards already in circulation, and the large investment 
required for their manufacture, personalization, and 
distribution, all the cards we examined are suscepti-
ble to privacy invasion and relay attacks. Some cards 
may be skimmed once and replayed at will, while 
others pose a modest additional synchronization  
burden to the attacker. After reverse-engineering the 
1This article was originally published as Heydt-Benjamin, Bailey, 
et al. (2008). The full version of this paper appears as a University 
of Massachusetts Amherst technical report (Heydt-Benjamin, Bailey, 
et al., 2006). See www.rfid-cusp.org for the latest version.
2See Associated Press (2003), Greenemeier (2006), Harper (2005), 
HowStuffWorks Inc. (2006), O’Connor (2005), and Schuman (2005).
3See International Organization for Standardization and International 
Electrotechnical Commission (2006).
secret protocols between RFID-enabled credit cards 
and readers, we were able to build a device capable 
of mounting several advanced replay attacks under 
laboratory conditions. While absolute security and 
privacy in a contactless card form factor may be im-
possible to achieve, we hope that the next generation 
of RFID-enabled payment systems will protect 
against the vulnerabilities that our study identifies.
NOTES
4While the referenced report is short on details, it seems likely that 
the tests involved passive eavesdropping of some kind, rather than 
direct skimming.
5See Adida et al. (2006); Anderson, Bond, and Murdoch (2006); 
and UK Chip and PIN Program (2006).
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